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1‘Kandinsky-fying’ the Law: A Translaborative Use of Abstract Art in the 




Sources of law are made up of terms that, amongst other things, mediate 
between facts and different results, and it is the role of lawyers to explain or 
justify why a particular interpretation or permutation of a given term should be 
taken in a given case. Such terms do not exist in isolation, but are hugely 
contextual and play an integral role in intermediating between different 
potential outcomes. Therefore, the skill of carefully applying and using legal 
terms is one of the primary focuses of legal education and calls for a 
consideration of the intricate role that legal terms play in legal argumentation. 
However, sometimes this endeavour in the law classroom is affected by the 
focus placed on the meaning of individual terms, as opposed to the broader 
role they have in legal reasoning and the analysis of legal outcomes. In 
considering this, this paper draws a contrast between the way in which 
students sometimes use different legal and moral terms in the various roles in 
their lives outside of the classrooms and within, and contends that one of the 
reasons for this is the greater liberty that they feel in using different terms 
2outside of the classroom. This paper contends that, pedagogically, a similar 
level of independence can be achieved through the collaborative translation of 
legal concepts into abstract art, by enabling students to take greater co-
ownership of legal language. Specifically, it argues that Wassily Kandinsky’s 
art theory, with its emphasis on the spirit and emotions, can provide an 
effective framework for this.
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If he thought, or may have thought, that in throwing the child he was 
exposing him to only the slight risk of being injured, then you would 
probably readily conclude that he did not intend to cause serious 
injury, because it was outside his contemplation that he would be 
seriously injured. But the defence say here that he never thought about 
the consequence at all when he threw the child. He did not give it a 
moment's thought. Again, if that is right, or may be right, you may 
readily conclude that he did not appreciate that serious harm would 
result. It follows from that, if that is how you find, that you cannot 
infer that he intended to do Karl really serious harm unless you are sure 
3that serious harm was a virtual certainty from what he was doing and 
he appreciated that that was the case.
(Regina v Woollin 1998) 
1. The Spaces of Law: Translaboration and Abstract Art?
From one standpoint, lawyering can be understood as the considered 
utilisation of normative terms in the construction of an argument with a view 
to identifying just outcomes (Lindahl 2004). Different sources of law in this 
jurisdiction, England and Wales, including Acts of Parliament and common 
law cases, for example, enshrine principles comprised of legal terms, such as 
‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’, and it is the role of a lawyer to put forward why those 
terms must have certain legal outcomes in settling disputes between parties in 
a case. Logic is fundamental here. Lawyers have to carefully show why a set 
of facts must lead to a particular set of outcomes. This gives rise to a number 
of observations, not least that most legal terms are not inert, but can only be 
understood in the complex ecosystem of a set of facts and potential legal 
results. For instance, the legal term ‘duty’ is important to a claim of 
negligence. However, it cannot be fully appreciated in the abstract. In order to 
appreciate the full significance of the legal term ‘duty’, it must be conjoined to 
yet another legal notion, ‘to care’, resulting in an entirely new legal term, a 
‘duty of care’; but even then, to fully appreciate what a ‘duty of care’ actually 
imports to a negligence case, it is important to then, in the context of a 
4negligence case, connect it to a set of facts. Hence, a multifaceted chain 
emerges. For example, if a case concerned a doctor, a lawyer might use the 
legal notion of a ‘duty of care’ to posit the argument that a certain standard of 
behaviour was expected of the doctor and that a failure to behave in that 
manner supports a claim of negligence and an outcome of damages. In this 
way, the legal terms of ‘duty’, ‘standard of care’, etc. can only be understood 
within the universe of a set of facts and potential legal outcomes and become 
an integral part of a logic-based, deductive syllogism that leads from the 
former to the latter. This has similar parallels, for example, to what Alf Ross 
argued in relation to legal rights, particularly ownership – that the one term 
‘ownership’ links certain sets of facts with potential rights-based outcomes 
(Spaak 2014). However, the legal terms that are used in such a syllogism to 
intermediate between different legal outcomes are, of course, normative and 
can be developed in many different ways depending on the ethical and other 
reasons that are used to support them (Lindahl 2004). It follows that such 
complex terms of law operate within an ecosystem dependent not only on the 
facts in a particular case and the plethora of possible outcomes that a legal 
system may support, but also various other, interspersing atmospheres, 
including the social, the economic, the cultural and ethical amongst many 
others, which may be used to develop legal argument (Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos 2015). Such terms, which exist in a number of different spaces, 
therefore draw and call for an analysis of a multitude of different strata, in the 
5development and posting of arguments. As such, the faculty of utilising legal 
terms by deciphering their many different nuances and spaces is an important 
skill of a lawyer – and law classrooms can be perceived as an environment 
where the lecturer and law student collaborate on this endeavour, and 
deconstruct the different shades and significance of legal terms. 
However, occasionally, this collaboration does not go as far as it could do. 
What ought to be a vibrant, all-embracing discussion between the tutor and 
student on the outcomes of various legal terms, within an intricate ecosystem 
consisting of different spaces and colours, stops short. One of the reasons for 
this, which will be explored in this paper, is that legal analysis in the 
classroom occasionally gets fixed on legal terms as isolated lexical units for 
longer than it should do. A lot of time is sometimes spent on looking at what 
legal terms such as ‘reasonableness’, ‘duty of care’ and ‘intention’ mean, both 
in and of themselves and further with reference to sources of law, such as 
cases. Whilst this is, without question, fundamental, it is also crucial, given 
what has been said above about the wider contextual role of legal terms, to 
continue to explore their many spaces and milieus, particularly in the factual 
ecosystem described above. Tutors do, of course, have many effective 
pedagogical methods for doing this. Moots, debates and presentations, 
amongst other methods, are common in law schools across the world. 
However, this paper posits that using abstract art can also be a powerful 
6medium, especially from a translaborative perspective. This is because, as 
discussed above, legal terms can only truly be understood within the context of 
an ecosystem made up of facts, possible legal outcomes, and many further 
intricately connected social, ethical and other spheres – indeed some changing 
over of time – and it is the central role of a lawyer to take those legal terms 
within those spheres, picture them together in a syllogism, and argue why a 
particular outcome must follow given the different premises in a case, such as 
the legal and evidential, and various standards of proof. In this way, legal 
terms are specifically used to identify and render appropriate legal results 
within the context of a case. It is arguable that what occurs within this intricate 
ecosystem is a normative transformation, or ‘translation’, of particular legal 
terms, such as ‘reasonableness’, ‘remoteness’, and ‘fairness’, into appropriate 
legal results and, not just in law classrooms but also in legal cases, this often 
involves a multitude of different actors who each bring their own subjectivity 
and power, collaboratively, to bear upon this transformation/translation of the 
law into outcomes. An element of translation as collaboration 
(‘translaboration’) occurs and this paper will now develop the pedagogical 
value that abstract art can bring to this activity in law classrooms. 
2. The Soundlessness of Lexical Units: Regina v Woollin (1998)
As mentioned, this paper reflects on a state of affairs that sometimes occurs in 
law classrooms – namely the focus on legal terms as isolated lexical units. 
7Important concepts such as ‘foresight’, ‘reasonableness’, and ‘proximity’ are 
often defined and looked at in and of themselves, without reference to the 
various colours or strata that may determine if such legal terms do or do not 
apply in a particular case. For this reason, when these legal terms are later 
applied to facts, or examined in essays, the analysis is often not as detailed or 
probing as it could be if there were an absorption in the wider vibrations, or 
interpretations, of those concepts. Silence sometimes abounds when there 
ought to be sound. 
The seminal case of Regina v Woollin (1998) provides a very useful 
illustration. In this case, the House of Lords had to consider if the defendant, 
who had thrown his three-year-old son against a solid surface, had intended to 
kill him or cause him serious injury. The Law Lords identified that ‘intention’ 
in criminal law was not just limited to where the defendant specifically wanted 
something to occur, but could also exist when a particular outcome was a 
virtually certain consequence of the defendant pursuing another particular aim 
and the defendant appreciated this. This latter two-stage test, otherwise known 
as ‘oblique intention’, constitutes one of the two main legal tests for intention 
in English criminal law, a culpable state of mind, the first one being ‘direct 
intent’. As the definition of oblique intention in Woollin, the leading case, 
states, it is based, inter alia, on an appreciation of the risk – that there is a 
virtual certainty said outcome will occur. This imports the requirement that the 
8defendant must have had some realisation of risk, which in turn can be related 
to the importance that criminal law attaches to the notions of agency and 
blame (see, for example, Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 on 
subjectivity). The issue of whether a given defendant had an appreciation or 
foresight of the risk requires one to put oneself in the position of the 
defendant. It necessitates a consideration of a multitude of different factors, 
including the characteristics of the defendant, his or her mood around the time 
of the offence, the circumstances in which s/he found himself or herself, and 
also his or her reactions to them. As such, the application of the concept of 
‘appreciation or foresight of risk’ is a composite one that takes in a complexity 
of many factors. 
However, the notion of ‘an appreciation or foresight’ of risk has often been 
approached in terms of its constituent and individual lexical units. This has 
sometimes influenced, as discussed above, the analysis of the various spaces 
that are indispensable to the application of legal terms. The focus has every so 
often been on what the words ‘appreciation’, ‘foresight’ and ‘risk’ mean per 
se, devoid of context. This has, from time to time, led to a staid consideration 
of the law as opposed to its wider import. However, returning back to the point 
that was made at the beginning of this paper, from one perspective, lawyering 
in and of itself is about the considered application of terms and their various 
meanings across different spaces. As contended, one may argue that legal 
9terms get their validity from this and cannot be understood devoid of this 
consideration of law’s different spaces (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2015). 
However, in classrooms, this consideration sometimes does not go as far as it 
could. 
For this reason, this paper furthers that the collaborative, intersemiotic 
translation1 of legal terms into particular types of images (specifically abstract 
art) could provide an effective means for analysing the many nuances of law, 
and the contextual and semantic strata of legal terms. How might this 
intersemiotically translaborative method of transforming law into abstract art 
in law classrooms work and what are the pedagogic rationales for it? 
3. Ontology and the Importance of Ownership in Legal Education 
Looking at new ways of studying law is important, especially in terms of 
engaging formative assessment (Feliú and Frazer 2012). Ontologically, this 
paper posits that there should be no difference between how law students 
discuss situations outside of the law school environment and within it. 
However, there is sometimes a tendency to perceive the law school as a closed 
system that is removed from other spaces in their lifeworld. One of the bases 
of this paper is that these systems are, essentially, one ontological continuum. 
At home, for example, law students will have been involved in disagreements 
with family and friends, amongst others. This will have involved the defence 
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of some position that the law student holds. These standpoints will naturally 
turn on and be underpinned by strong normative terms such as ‘right’, ‘fair’ 
and ‘wrong’. In the course of these arguments, the conscious focus will not be 
on the meaning of these terms as lexical units – but often on developing a 
persuasive and compelling argument out of the many different milieus that 
bring or coalesce those terms together in their favour. One of the fundamental 
bases of this paper is that law students should take the same argumentative and 
questioning approach in law classrooms.
This leads onto another strand of this paper. As mentioned, the primary 
assertion that is being made is that, ontologically, there ought to be no 
difference between how law students look at contentious arguments outside of 
law school and within. They all call for a wider, contextual analysis and 
application of normative and other terms. However, many complex existential 
boundaries can arise (though certainly not in all cases). We need to ask, first of 
all, why students tend to see themselves differently within law schools and 
outside of them. One reason that will be postulated here can be related to 
emotions. When students are asked to defend a position outside of the law 
school environment, then it is feelings and emotive responses that sometimes 
propel them to fervently consider and apply many wider contexts – the moral, 
the social, the economic, the political etc. It is their own personal, emotional 
investment in a given viewpoint that strengthens their application of such 
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terms during the course of arguments and helps them further what they 
believe.  That is not to say that students never get passionate about the law! 
But law students differ from one another. As Deborah Zalesne and David 
Nadvorney (2011), for instance, identify in their work on ‘academic 
intelligence’ and ‘othering’, students have different intelligences and will 
approach the study of law in many different ways. 
For this reason, some students may strongly focus on a need to look at and 
understand the lexical units that make up legal principles – as opposed to the 
many nuances and spaces that imbue the application of the law in its 
ecosystem, as considered at the outset of this paper – and this may sometimes 
lead to a heavy emphasis on lexical units in isolation as opposed to the 
multiple spaces in which they exist and, indeed, on which they rely. This can 
affect the extent to which the law is argued with. Such a heavy focus on words 
can sometimes also arise because of a misunderstanding of the taxonomy of 
legal education (for an interesting discussion on the growing taxonomy of 
legal education, see Feliú and Frazer 2012, 189). Taxonomies generally arise 
when competencies are linked and classified according to objectives. It is, of 
course, important to identify learning outcomes. Nevertheless, some students 
may focus heavily on the words that constitute the learning outcomes, as 
opposed to their detailed, contextual application within a course, which can 
limit argumentation.
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As such, another premise of this paper is that, essentially, stimulating a greater 
and freer emotive attachment amongst students to the law – such as they have 
outside the law classroom – can foster a stronger analysis of the law in the 
ecosystem discussed above. There is, of course, nothing novel in that. Every 
law lecturer endeavours to deliver a motivating and thought-provoking class. 
However, taking recourse to intersemiotic translation, in particular between 
legal language and abstract art, can add value. As will be discussed below, the 
collaborative transformation of law into abstract art, drawing particularly upon 
the art theory of Wassily Kandinsky (1866–1944), can provide a powerful and 
effective medium for emotively examining the ecosystem of the law and 
enable students to discuss how complex terms, cutting across many different 
spaces, mediate between facts and possible legal outcomes.
4. The Concreteness of Words in Contrast to Art
What is the rationale for this form of pedagogy? On a very broad level, 
normative terms can, of course, have many different permutations. For 
example, the single word ‘morality’ can be approached from a number of 
different standpoints, including the consequentialist and deontological, 
amongst others. Terms change their meaning when they are added to other 
terms, as seen with a ‘duty of care’, and even more so when various contexts 
are added. Moreover, there is obviously a multitude of other layers and 
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nuances associated with the way words ‘mean’, including alterity as well 
social, cultural and literary aspects, among many others. 
It is arguable that these many semantic nuances can, in and of themselves, 
already lead to the powerful feelings that are required to encourage a deeper, 
more personal attachment to a given term. For example, the word ‘fair’ often 
leads to impassioned discussions. But despite the fervent debates that such 
powerful terms may encourage, they are often bound to strong preconceived 
meanings, backed up by frameworks of power – which, in some cases, can 
stymie the freedom and independence required to encourage their deeper 
consideration.
The natural question here becomes why abstract art? (Shusterman 2000). For 
the purposes of answering this question, this paper postulates that art is any 
configuration whose sovereignty of meaning for a stirred actor must at all 
times be in abeyance. This can be explained by way of a simple example. A 
person goes to a coffee shop with a friend. They sit down at a table with a 
coffee and start talking to their friend. They are not conscious of their coffee 
cup. At this stage, arguably, the coffee cup cannot be art for them, as they are 
not engaged with it. But they then notice the cup. They see how perfectly 
round it is. They conclude it must be round as this is conducive to drinking 
and that is it. It is arguable that at this stage the cup cannot be considered art 
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but rather a simple instrument as the agent has claimed meaning. But they then 
become intrigued by its form – and ultimately conclude that they will never be 
in a position to know why it is round. It is only when the drinker concedes that 
sovereignty of meaning must by definition rest elsewhere that the object, in 
this instance the cup, is on its way to becoming art. Thus, from one 
perspective, art is a meaningful and elusive search for meaning, and a forever 
continuous search at that. 
This can be broadly related to the important notion of ‘apartness’, which 
Simon O’Sullivan (2001) explores in relation to theorists such as Jean-
François Lyotard and others. Following this line of thinking, for the artist, art 
can arguably be pure liberation (Scruton 1998). They realise that, in creating a 
piece of art, whose meaning is by definition always held in some abeyance, 
they are free and they can feel emotionally liberated. That is why this paper 
claims that collaborative translations of legal terms into art between a student, 
lecturer and others in the law classroom can free students, in the ontological 
ways examined above, and potentially provide a medium for looking at the 
meaning of legal terms in their complex ecosystem. Students can draw those 
spaces and discuss them precisely becaue art is different to written or verbal 
communication. Terms tend to sit within the structure of a lexicon and they 
can bind the writer or speaker. That is, of course, not to belittle language as a 
form of art. There have, of course, been countless theatrical, poetic and 
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narrative pieces of writing that have taken human feelings to many different 
levels. However, I would suggest that what made these actual ‘words’ art was 
that the reader or listener could never claim complete ownership over their 
meaning. Art is, by definition, always the meaningful yet elusive search for 
meaning itself. 
It is on the grounds that this paper posits that an artistic and collaborative 
‘translation’ between the different actors in the classroom can provide a free 
and emotive space in which to go beyond the meaning of isolated terms and 
explore the multiple spaces under which the law operates and, indeed, on 
which legal terms depend. The next section will explore how abstract art and, 
in particular, Wassily Kandinsky’s pedagogy, can specifically assist in this 
endeavour. 
5. Using ‘Kandinskyian’ Pedagogy in the Law Classroom 
From one perspective, there is a criticism that can be levelled against the idea 
of using art, and particularly abstract art, in teaching law and exploring how it 
may apply in a case. It could be argued that law should not be compared to art 
since, while the ambiguity and suspense of meaning is the very raison d’être 
of art, the precision of terms is the actual bread and butter of law. The very 
industry of law often entails using a tribunal to settle the meaning and 
application of terms in order to resolve legal disputes, as opposed to art where 
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any form of meaning must always remain in some form of anticipation. It 
would thus be paradoxical if legal terms were open to different, subjective 
meanings, as this would prolong rather than settle cases. 
However, legal terms are not stagnant. They are, by definition, contextual. 
This is because they are normative and provide lawyers with the propositions 
that they need to form legal arguments in a given context. Furthermore, even 
tribunals need terms to be flexible in order to render a fair judgement. So, 
whilst the end point may be certainty, the actual process of getting there is 
highly context-specific and rests upon logical deduction and the skill of using 
complex definitions (Macagno 2010). For example, if one were to take the 
legal concept of ‘appreciation of risk’ per se from Regina v Woollin (1998), it 
would require one to be cognisant of a number of wider strata as discussed 
above. Indeed, learning outcomes in law often talk about the need to 
understand the law in its wider contexts and this is undeniably a fundamental 
skill in working with the law (Lynch 2011). However, as discussed, sometimes 
some law students cling tenaciously to words. Rather than by necessity 
venturing out and exploring the law’s many diverse, contextual spaces, they 
prefer to stick closely to its literal interpretations. Therefore, the very freedom 
that art, and abstract art with its emphasis on feeling in particular, affords is an 
effective means to motivate students to explore the various contours of the 
law. 
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The idea that students can, collaboratively, explore and transform law via its 
intersemiotic translation into images with the assistance of their facilitators 
and peers is, of course, not original. Many lecturers use diagrams and pictures 
in teaching law. However, this paper argues that Kandinsky’s ideas on ‘the 
spiritual in art’, explicitly, can form the basis of a dedicated pedagogy in law 
(Kandinsky [1911] 2011).
As raised, there is a basic ontological divide between how some students apply 
different normative terms, such as ‘fair’ and ‘right’, within the law school 
environment on the one hand and in the many diverse situations in which they 
find themselves outside of that environment on the other. In many cases, this 
can be explained with reference to emotive attachments. Students tend to feel 
more emotively connected and in ownership of the language that they use 
outside of the law school environment and, as such, they feel much more self-
assured in making use of their lexicon’s various meanings, connotations, and 
nuances. They may also spend more time, and often take more care, in 
exploring the different spaces and contexts that engage the concepts denoted 
by a given formulation as a result of this feeling. That is not to say that 
feelings are the only reasons. However, there is often resonance and assurance 
that comes with the feelings associated with ownership.
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It is for this reason that I claim that Kandinsky’s ‘spiritual in art’, which 
focuses on the way in which representations in and of the world can be 
transformed into images through emotive engagement ultimately leading to 
emotive translation, can be used as a means to enable students to take greater 
co-ownership of legal argumentations in the law classroom (Easteal 2008). 
Rather than being bound by the finitude of complex legal terms, the 
transformation of such legal terms into abstract art and the emotive ownership 
and freedom that this can bring, as explained by Kandinsky, can stimulate 
them into looking at the complex nature of terms beyond just a literal approach 
to words. The production of abstract art, in particular the discrete theory 
underpinning Kandinsky’s approach to this form of art (Kandinsky [1911] 
2011, cited in Ringborn 1966), can free students in a way that can not only 
facilitate greater legal discussion and analysis, but also be conducive to the 
placing and use of legal terms within the various spaces that are necessary to 
understand them. This specific form of intersemiotic translation can thus prove 
a very valuable add-on to more traditional teaching methods in appreciating 
the context-specific nature of legal terms and their role, and multi-spatial 
dimension, as normative propositions in the construction of legal arguments. 
The next section will go into more detail on why Kandinsky’s theory has been 
chosen as a specific frame of reference for this paper. 
6. The ‘Kandinskyian’ Spirit and Legal Analysis 
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Kandinsky’s later art is mainly of an abstract nature and thus does not always 
directly represent actual phenomena in the world. Instead, a symphony of 
points, lines, shapes, and colours on a canvass is used to depict what 
Kandinsky sees. Often difficult to comprehend at first, these visual 
orchestrations are best read as expressions of complex emotional states. 
Indeed, for Kandinsky, art was mainly a medium of the ‘spirit’. A simple 
point, or mark on a canvas, was both silent and spoke at the same time – 
because it did not necessarily represent anything in particular, but rather 
constituted a language through which the artist expressed himself. The artist 
could turn any point on a canvass into a line to represent movement, or make 
that line horizontal to convey stillness, or vertical for anticipation. Diagonals 
represented a symbiosis of the two. Varying forces could be applied to the 
brush, turning lines into different shapes, angles or curves – and space and 
colour could also be used to represent sensation. Indeed, the width of lines 
often depicted sound (Kandinsky 1979). 
Kandinsky’s notion of abstract imagery as expressive of interiority was 
furthered by his synaesthesia, a neurological phenomenon where an 
experience in one sensory modality simultaneously triggers a sensory 
resonance in another. For instance, if a sound-colour synaesthete hears a given 
sound, this is also, and simultaneously, perceived as a particular colour. 
Indeed, colour played an important role in Kandinsky’s life and work, partly 
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due to his ‘eidetic’ ability to remember colours and pictures with practically 
photographic recall from a very early age. From a synaesthetic perspective, 
this eidetic ability was linked by Kandinsky to auditory-based notions such as 
principles of consonance and discord: the adult Kandinsky was a keen music 
theorist and personal friend of the avant garde composer (and amateur painter) 
Schoenberg (1874-1951) (Brand and Hailey 1997). Colour is thus ‘vibrant’ 
(the auditory again) in many of Kandinsky’s images and is a fundamental 
component of many of his abstract compositions. 
This can be further related to the notion of the ‘spirit’ that formed a strong 
element of Kandinsky’s work – Kandinsky felt that what he perceived through 
the senses touched or awakened something transcendent inside of him, and it 
was this transcendent element, or ‘spirit’, that he represented on the canvas. 
The notion of the ‘spirit’ in Kandinsky’s work, particularly his reference to the 
‘soul’, connotes specific qualities connected by him to esoteric theosophical 
doctrines, a set of beliefs according to which a particular blend of comparative 
religion, philosophy and science can provide direct knowledge of the origins 
and purpose of the universe (Carlson 2015). Such knowledge was often 
attributed to what was, at the time, understood as a capacity for synaesthesia 
restricted to an initiated few. Ideas of synaethesia inflected through theosophy, 
often of a Russian hieratic nature, were a major influence on Kandinsky’s 
contemporaries in the arts, such as the composer Scriabin (1871-1915) and 
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fellow visual artists Mondrian (1872-1944) and Klee (1879-1940), the latter of 
whom was one of Kandinsky’s teaching colleagues at the Bauhaus in 
Germany. While synaesthesia is now known to be much more widespread than 
was believed at that time and hence the opposite of a psychological ‘curiosity’ 
(Hubbard and Ramachandran 2005, 509), figures like Kandinsky saw it as 
offering privileged aesthetic insights, notably into the holistic, creative nature 
of perception. For example, Vincent Tomas’s exposition of Kandinsky’s 
interpretation of synaesthesia states that when “we aesthetically see colours, 
points, lines, and shapes, what we feel is analogous to (expressive of) sounds, 
tastes, odours, and touches. We apprehend the ‘spiritual vibration’ as a means 
of using the senses” (Tomas 1969, 27).
Recent theorists of law pursuing equivalent aesthetic implications of 
synaesthesia in the light of findings of neurocognitive science have argued that 
the law is more fruitfully understood as existing in multi- and cross-sensorial 
dimensions too, which challenge long-standing notions of the juridical: “What 
is the ‘smell’ of law?” is a serious question posed by one such study in this 
field (Carneiro, Venturi and Becker 2014). While recent interpretations of 
Kandinsky’s synaesthesia place the emphasis on its being an involuntary 
experience (Van Campen 1997), the special significance attributed to it by 
Kandinsky can still be used as a point of reference, in conjunction with what 
has been said earlier about the spaces of law, to motivate liberation and a 
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greater emotive connection with the law and encourage more freedom in 
looking at its many lexical nuances (Poling 1986). How might this work? 
Let’s imagine that students were given the following hypothetical set of facts: 
A urgently needs a large sum of money, but does not have any means of 
getting it. Therefore, one evening, he decides to burn his house down to claim 
the insurance. He realises that there is a near certain chance his family will die, 
but realises that he must act now. He burns his house down and his family 
dies. A is charged with murder, which requires, inter alia, that the killing was 
intentional. However, A argues that he should not be liable for murder as it 
was not his intention to kill his family, but to claim the insurance.
In such a case, students would have to apply the criminal law of intention, 
which, as mentioned above, can be found in cases such as Regina v Woollin 
(1998). This says a defendant can intend something not just where it was their 
primary purpose for acting (direct intention), but also where they had a 
separate primary intention for acting, and in the course of doing so, a 
particular result was virtually certain to occur and they realised this too but 
still went ahead (oblique intention). As the court in Regina v Woollin (1998) 
held with respect to oblique intention: “you cannot infer that he intended to do 
Karl really serious harm unless you are sure that serious harm was a virtual 
certainty from what he was doing and he appreciated that that was the case.”
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Oblique intention would arguably also apply to the hypothetical case of A 
above, and in such a case, a number of discrete pedagogic approaches could be 
taken in analysing this form of mens rea (guilty mind). There could, for 
example, be a straightforward, general discussion of the law of oblique 
intention and what notions such as ‘virtual certainty’ mean, and the test could 
then be applied to the facts. The tutor could also divide the students into two 
teams, the defence and the prosecution, and ask them to consider if A did have 
the oblique intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm his family and, if 
so, why so under the law. The tutor could also ask them to draw any number 
of diagrams to depict this. There could be many other approaches too.
However, abstract art can provide a particularly effective medium here. If art 
is any configuration whose sovereignty of meaning for a stirred actor must at 
all times be in abeyance, and thus has the potential of freeing the student/artist 
and is conducive to expression, it can act as a conduit for useful and efficient 
discussion. In other words, the personal investment that comes with a piece of 
art can provide students with the feelings and liberty to consider the different 
nuances and ambiences of the law within its complex factual and legal 
ecosystem as described above, and express and explore their ideas about the 
law, all of which they may otherwise not do, especially if the focus remains on 
lexical items in isolation.
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Aspects of Kandinsky’s art theory, with its emphasis on sensations, can thus 
prove very effective here. Indeed, the very personal nature of Kandinsky’s 
focus on emotive translation would not require that students follow a particular 
form. Rather, its main point would be to encourage students to draw the law 
based on how they feel about a case – to look at what the legal terms in their 
legal ecosystem mean for the students, how the legal terms might interconnect 
with a set of facts, what results the students might expect to follow – and once 
they have drawn their images, to ask them to talk about them. This would 
enable them to move away from the law as a mere code made up of individual 
lexical units. By way of example, a horizontal line could, for instance, 
represent the ‘you’ in Regina v Woollin (1998):
----------------------------------------------
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
---------------------------------------------
The word ‘inference’ by a diagonal line conveying possibility:
----------------------------------------------
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
--------------------------------------------
The consequence of ‘serious harm’ could be a circle with no end or beginning, 
signifying the complexity of harm: 
----------------------------------------------
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INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
---------------------------------------------
The notion that oblique intention is based on whether serious harm was 
‘virtually certain’ could be shown by a wavy line representing the many forces 
that contribute to certainty: 
----------------------------------------------
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
---------------------------------------------
And the requirement that the ‘defendant also appreciated that risk was 
virtually certain’ could be depicted by numerous diagonal lines:
----------------------------------------------
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
---------------------------------------------
Colour could be added to suggest feeling or emotion: for example, red to 
represent ‘serious injury’, green on the flexibility of ‘virtual certainty’, and a 
white plane imbuing all with justice:
----------------------------------------------
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE
---------------------------------------------
Such abstract images, with their various points, shapes, lines and 
colours, put together to represent the diverse ecosystem of the law, can give 
students liberation and a frame of reference to explain how and why they 
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believe the law applies in a certain way – in a way that words, with strong 
preconceived associations of meaning and other possible lexical and power 
structures, may not. On the facts above, for instance, students could alter the 
green arrow in a way to show that death was more of a virtual certainty. The 
images would stand in the same, albeit intersemiotic, relationship as the words 
amidst an ecosystem and syllogism mediating between the various facts, 
relevant normative major and minor premises and conclusions, but the 
students would feel more liberated because of the ‘apartness’ that comes with 
art. The images would show their arguments and it would be up to them to 
explain how the image represents their analysis and understanding of the law. 
They could use their images to discuss the various valid arguments that often 
arise within the various milieus of the law, for example, around whether a 
defendant who set fire to a house knowing that there were people inside could 
have ‘obliquely intended’ the killing or serious bodily injury of those inside, 
the mens rea of murder – but this time, using the transformative freedom of 
law drawn as abstract art. They could also look at the various logical spaces in 
between facts and the law (Sartor 2008) making reference to the images they 
have produced. A broad comparison can be drawn with what Sara Gordon 
(2013) says about the importance of considering different techniques for 
instructing juries in trials as they may all apply their own personal schemas 
and lexicons to interpreting and applying the legal terms that the judges give 
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them in instructions. The images could serve as one such technique for 
students to discuss their different schemas.
7. The Piano and Sounds of Justice: A Conclusion  
Whilst any images that students may draw may seem abstract at first and 
appear to have no ostensible, logical meaning, any depictions would have 
absolute legal resonance and meaning for students. If we hold that art is a 
meaningful yet elusive search for meaning, the composition of abstract art 
would give the tutor and students a free and powerful space in which to 
discuss how legal terms mediate between facts and the law and also provide 
scope for a critique and analysis of the very law itself. In collaboration, the 
lecturer would be required to talk to the student, and students to each other, 
about the art pieces in order to discuss their feelings about that particular piece 
of law and how it applies, and provide feedback. In this way, students would 
use their art as a medium to render and navigate different legal concepts 
(DeGroff 2012). The liberation inherent in art could facilitate this, whereas 
often the perceived finitude and concreteness of words with their many 
different structures may not (Tomas 1969). That is the basis on which this 
paper posits that abstract art in particular could support a powerful, 
transformative and collaborative space in which to explore the many nuances 
and applications of the law. The ecosystem could be mapped. Students in law 
schools begin their legal education with words. They tackle those words with 
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great fervour and this often means that they take a rich approach to the law. 
Many students maintain this energy and do extremely well. However, 
sometimes, the finitude of words and a misconstruction of SMART (Specific, 
Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Time-Related) learning outcomes (Feliú 
and Frazer 2012) disrupts this flow and students begin to focus more on the 
abstractness of legal terms as opposed to their deeper, contextual strata, which, 
as discussed above, is fundamental to give legal terms proper effect. I argue 
that using abstract art as a pedagogic tool may assuage this. 
Furthermore, some of Kandinsky’s ideas discussed above, especially on the 
‘spirit’ and emotive translation of interiority into images, provide a good 
framework for this rendering of the law into art. This is because, as a result of 
the ontological continuum considered in section 3 above, they enable students 
to fully connect with themselves and their emotive responses in understanding 
the law. Kandinsky believed that when artists perceived the world their soul 
vibrated. These vibrations could then be drawn as points, lines and colours on 
a plane. In this way, art was an intricate manifestation of how the world 
moved their soul. It encapsulated their spirit. As Kandinsky wrote, “the soul is 
the piano with the strings and the artist is the hands which by mean the 
tangents call forth the vibration of the human soul” (Kandinsky [1911] 2011, 
cited in Ringborn 1966, 400). For Kandinsky, art was the external expression 
of an internal. In parallel, I would argue that, in the same way, students can 
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begin by asking themselves what a law means to them: how it evokes their 
inner feelings and emotions. They could be asked to focus on the facts of a 
case, and how they think the law should apply, and in working with their 
tutors and peers, be asked to represent this as a symphony of lines, shapes and 
colours. In this translaborative space, such works of art can be used to give 
sound to their inner feelings and understanding of a case, and, indeed, the 
piano of justice within them, justice being, not least, a feeling: and they can 
draw their feelings about the law and how it should apply in its many contexts, 
thus giving full voice to the orchestra of law and logic that resides within 
them. The legal ecosystem can thus be explored.
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 Intersemiotic translation was defined by Roman Jakobson in his essay “On 
Linguistic Aspects of Translation” as “an interpretation of verbal signs by 
means of signs of nonverbal sign systems” (Jakobson 1959, 233).
